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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TREATIES
AND DEVELOPMENT
Prof. Anselm Kamperman Sanders
Dalindyebo Shabalala

Introduction
The inclusion of issues of harmonization and enforcement of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the setting of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations was commonly understood to be a balancing act: promoting
industrialized country interests in return for greater access by developing
countries to markets for their goods and agricultural products. In the
multilateral setting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and more
specifically the TRIPS Agreement, this quid pro quo approach was hailed as a
global breakthrough for IP rights holders. With the TRIPS Council to provide a
platform for ensuring TRIPS compliance, and with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding in place to resolve differences without trade wars,
the future development of intellectual property law seemed set for
multilateralism. TRIPS also seemed to be a success for the strategy of shifting
forums from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), where
norm-setting had been halted since the 1970’s, to the WTO.
However, subsequent developments suggest that the TRIPS
Agreement was not as unequivocal a success for industrialized country IP
right holders as they would have wished. Issues such as protection for clinical
test data, parallel importation, protection of geographical indications, patents
on plants and plant genetic resources and especially IP enforcement
remained largely unresolved. In addition, the realization by many developing
countries that the trade-off between greater market access and greater IP
protection may not have worked out in their favor created a backlash to the
TRIPS Agreement. Developing countries renewed their historical skepticism
towards claims that higher intellectual property standards, established through
international treaties, would lead to better development outcomes through
innovation and technology transfer. They blocked further harmonization
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initiatives at WIPO such as the proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty1 and
delayed others such as the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting
Organizations2. They also kept issues such as such as stricter norms on
intellectual property enforcement essentially off the WTO agenda. They began
instead to seek changes to existing international instruments at the WTO and
at WIPO that they believed would make extant norms more favorable to
developing countries. At the WTO, this resulted in the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health3, and ongoing proposals for disclosure of origin of
genetic resources.4 At WIPO, this included beginning negotiations for treaties
on the protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore.5
As a result of this shift, the WTO and WIPO began to seem like less
favorable venues for increasing IP standards and enforcement. In the decade
from 2000 to 2010, this resulted in a shift of focus by a number of
industrialized countries, which still wanted to achieve higher standards but in
bilateral and regional free trade negotiations (“FTAs”), covering trade and
investment issues. There was also an accompanying increase in bilateral
investment treaty (“BIT”) activity. Many developing countries signed BITs and
FTAs but the number of these has already begun to decline significantly. This
does not necessarily mean a return to multilateral fora but suggests that new
plurilateral fora, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)6,
and the current Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations (TPP) probably
represent the next forum shift. This chapter explores the flourishing of
bilateralism and plurilateralism against the backdrop of the remaining
controversies, flexibilities, and loose ends of the TRIPS Agreement. We look
at the ways in which competing narratives about the relationship between
innovation, economic development and greater intellectual property protection
1

See WIPO “Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty” Available at: http://www.wipo.int/patentlaw/en/draft_splt.htm (last visited 19 February 2014).

2

See WIPO “Broadcasting Organizations”
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/broadcast.html (last visited 19 February 2014).

3

Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001)

4

WTO “Draft decision to enhance mutual supportiveness between the TRIPS agreement and
the Convention on Biological Diversity: Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia,
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, the ACP group, and the African group” TN/C/W/59,
19 April 2011.

5

WIPO, “Intergovernmental Committee” http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/ (last visited 19
February 2014).
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have both pushed and pulled against the pursuit of bilateralism and
plurilateralism in the post-TRIPS era.

Part I Investment and Intellectual Property
One of the keys to development, for a developing nation, is the ability to
attract investment, both domestic and foreign, in part because technology is
becoming a larger component of transactions both within and across countries
globally. For example, flows of intangibles such as patents, know-how and
other intellectual capital grow larger every year. Between 2005 and 2012,
payments for the use of intellectual property rose from approximately 141
Billion USD in 2005 to 213.7 billion USD in 2012, with a peak of 241.5 billion
USD in 2011. 7 Investment (foreign and domestic) in a knowledge-based
economy is central to any effort seeking to bridge the gap in development
between markets in developing nations and markets in developed nations.8
But what is the role of intellectual property in economic development?
Because of their monopolistic nature, many economists approach IPRs with a
great deal of caution. One can approach the topic along two different paths.
The first is to consider the role that intellectual property plays in enabling
domestic innovation and economic growth; the second is to focus instead on
the role that intellectual property plays in enabling FDI that transfers
technology through formal and informal spill-overs.
Intellectual property and national innovation

6

See Änti-Counterfeting Trade Agreement” Available at:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/acta.html (last visited 19 February 2014).
Japan is the depositary state. Participants included Australia, Canada, the European Union
(EU), Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the United
States of America. Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Morocco, New Zealand,
Singapore and the United States signed on 1 Oct 2011. The EU and some EU member states
signed it on January 26, 2012, but the EU as a whole did not ratify the treaty at the EU level
after it was rejected by the European Parliament. 6 instruments of ratification are required for
the ACTA to enter into force. (Article 39). After ratification by Japan in October 2012, there
have been no further ratifications, and the agreement has yet to enter into force.

7

World Bank, “Charges for the use of intellectual property, payments (BoP, current US$)”
Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD/countries?display=graph
(last visited 19 February 2014).

8

C Braga, K Fink and C Sepulveda, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development’, World Bank Discussion Paper No 412 (World Bank, 2000); see also R Mansell
and U When (eds.), INK—Knowledge Societies: Information Technology for Sustainable
Development (Oxford University Press, 1998).

We begin with the general role that intellectual property plays in
encouraging domestic innovation. Free and unrestricted competition lies at
the heart of the generally accepted western economic theory—free play of
market forces. Free competition between enterprises is thought to be the best
means to satisfy supply and demand and to maximize wealth in society as a
whole. Central to this proposition is the axiom that market participants can
compete on a level playing field so that all competitors face the same market
barriers, thus facilitating freedom of entry into the market. From this point of
view, legal interference in the market should be kept to a minimum. This does
not mean, however, that the policy towards markets should be one of laissez
faire. There is a compelling argument for laissez faire policy insofar as
interference in the market brings with it administrative costs that are incurred
from the transfer of the costs of competition from one market participant to the
other. Therefore, market intervention should result in a clear social benefit,
such as the release of more low-priced high quality products for which there is
consumer demand. In competitive markets, the process of spreading market
information helps to shape the opinions of market participants with regard to
profit-making activities,9 and is seen as socially beneficial. Government
intervention to enhance this aspect of competition is thus generally
acceptable, even in classical economic theory. This adage gives rise to the
premise in neo-classical theory that perfect knowledge will induce a situation
where the spontaneous interaction between knowledge possessors will lead
to a state of equilibrium and the optimum distribution of resources in society.10
This means that disturbances in knowledge creation, leading to imperfect
knowledge, need to be countered. Therefore, legal interference should aim to
provide a level playing field of ‘market information’ in which perfect knowledge
induces perfect competition. Laws on the protection of intellectual property
and competition can be seen in this light. Entitlements are allocated to specific
creators11 to safeguard valuable information generated by them against
expropriation, so that bargaining for or around the use of such information can
come into existence and promote a viable market. With most intellectual and
industrial creations, the establishment of a market for ideas is possible only if
the value of the idea can be evaluated or at least ‘guesstimated’ in advance.
This generally means revealing that idea to a potential buyer, who will then
9

F Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’ in Individualism and Economic Order (University of
Chicago Press, 1948) 106: ‘[c]ompetition is essentially a process of the formation of opinion:
by spreading information [i]t creates the views people have about what is best and cheapest’.

10

11

R Cooter and T Ulen, Law and Economics (2nd edn, Addison Wesley, 1997) Chapter 2.

The term creator is used in a broad sense here and includes inventors and innovators
independently of the speicifc IP entitlement(s) which may protect their ‘creations’.

already have acquired the idea at no cost.12 Intellectual property will then play
a role in controlling certain uses of that disclosed information. In the following
pages, we review how this applies to different intellectual property rights.
The role of government intervention through the creation of a right
facilitating such a bargaining process (and the related creation of a market)
has been demonstrated in the case of copyright. After the creation of the
entitlement, the role of the state is essentially complete. This means that the
transfer of the entitlement is left to the market, where a voluntary bargain can
be made between buyer and seller. This implies that the value of the
entitlement is also determined by the market and not by the state, unless the
state considers the market to have failed13 and chooses to impose a
compulsory license as a remedial step. This means that the value
determination and maximization typically require very little state intervention.14
This is not altogether surprising. According to the Coase Theorem, the
allocations of initial entitlements by the state are unimportant, since they are
transferred to their ‘highest value use’ through private bargaining leaving the
total output of the economy unaffected. One system of property rights is no
more efficient than another in this view.15 This means, however, that the
transaction costs of the (re)allocation of property rights and the rules
governing the exchange determine the efficiency of one system over the
other.16 In addition, the cost effectiveness of a protective regime depends on
the social costs that are incurred when protection is afforded in error, and
when the likelihood of overprotection by the system is real.
The economic rationale for the patent system17-- commonly described
as a system of incentives and rewards but perhaps more aptly described as a
monopoly that creates a barrier to entry.18 This is different in some respects
from copyright where there is no structural aim to encourage exchanges but
12

K Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in The Rate and
Direction of Economic Activity Economic and Social Factors (Princeton University Press,
1962) 609 and 615.

13

Market failure is a situation where creators are not rewarded for their creative efforts.

14

G Calabresi and A Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral’, (1972) 85 Harvard LR 1089 at 1092 and 1105.

15

16

R Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 J of Law and Economics, 1.

R Merges, ‘Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property’ (1994) 94 Columbia LR
2655 at 2664–7

larger focus on dissemination of the created product. In fact, there is no
pressure to disseminate, only facilitation to do so safely. In contrast, the
patent system has a structural bias towards disclosure, which is required
required in exchange for protection. That disclosure is meant to function as a
market signal – that a particular research path or area has been closed off
and other economic actors should reallocate their resources and that new
knowledge has been made available which can be built on, adapted and
used. This forces a licensing practice to evolve and serves two main ends.
First, the competitor faces a market barrier, equivalent to that encountered by
the first market entrant, thus leveling the playing field. Just like the first market
entrant the competitor has to pay for the innovative features of his product or
means of production. As a free-rider he would not have faced the same barrier
to market entry as the first market entrant and there would be no incentive for
a free-rider to be creative. Second, more creators produce a wider variety of
works that the public may be willing to pay for. This gives the consumer more
choice and facilitates the creation of new markets. Without the protective
regime of the patent system, which excludes free-riders, a situation of
asymmetric market failure could emerge. This makes it economically more
attractive to copy than to create. Why would one spend creative energy and
risk failure in the market when existing market success can be copied? The
result is that creators may have fewer incentives to produce works than the
public would be willing to pay for. The aspect of asymmetry is the situation
where one party, the creator, faces a market barrier and the other, a copyist,
does not.19 If a combination of market failure and asymmetry occurs, a pattern
emerges that holds true for all forms of intellectual property law.
Just like the patent system, which serves to stimulate disclosure of the
invention and thus encourage further development, one of the purposes of the
copyright system is to allow for the communication and use of information
expressed in a copyright work, either by additions to the public domain or by
rights acquisition on a licensing basis.20 Where a new work relies on previous
work and ideas, the new work should not benefit the copyright holder through
17

E Kaufer, The Economics of the Patent System (Harwood Academic Publishers GmbH,
1989) and P Heald, ‘Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption’
(1991) 76 Iowa LR, 962–65.

18

H Demsetz, ‘Barriers to Entry’ (1982) 72 American Economic R, 47: ‘[t]he problem of
defining ownership is precisely that of creating properly scaled legal barriers to entry’.

19

For a definition of asymmetric market failure and the role of intellectual property law in
providing a remedy against the resulting loss in wealth see W Gordon, ‘Asymmetric Market
Failure and Prisoners Dilemma in Intellectual Property’ (1992) 17 University of Dayton LR,
853.

monopoly rents in excess of the value the new work has added to total
welfare.21 It would be wasteful competition22 to gain benefits on the basis of the
value of the underlying work, which often consists of contributions by others
that may already be in the public domain, or never have been susceptible to
copyright.23 If there are many potential users of the work, it may become too
costly to negotiate individual licences for every use that is made of it. This is
especially true when works have become de facto industry standards, which
may be the case in database, software,24 and ICT industries, where
appropriate pricing according to “Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory”
(FRAND) terms turns out to be difficult. In such cases, patent control of a
standard imposes an absolute barrier to participation in the market where the
patent holder refuses to license or will only license on terms that make
reasonable competition impossible or unlikely to occur at the level of the
product category. Examples include the series of cases in Europe relating to
the Orange Book Standard for rewritable optical disk media25 and the
intervention by the European Commission in the series of licensing disputes
between Apple and Samsung.26
The trademark system displays different characteristics, in that it was
not envisaged as a system of incentives and rewards, but as a regulation of
20

For a representation of traditional patent and copyright protection and the varying level of
creativity required, see E Mackay, ‘Legal Hybrids: Beyond Property and Monopoly?’ (1994) 94
Columbia LR, 2630.

21

W Landes and R Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 J of
Economic Studies 325, 347–353, offer the economic rationale for not protecting ideas.

22

S Besen and L Raskind, ‘An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property’
(1991) J of Economic Perspectives 3, 5.

23

F Warren-Boulton, K Baseman and G Woroch, ‘The Economics of Intellectual Property
Protection for Software: The Proper Role for Copyright’ (1995) 3 Standard View, 68–78.

24

See US v Microsoft 97 F Supp 2d 59 (JS App 253–279). The findings of fact of the District
Court are reported at 84 F Supp 2d 9 (JS App 46–246). The conclusions of law of the District
Court are reported at 87 F Supp 2d 30 (JS App 1–43). The final judgment of the District Court
is reported at 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (J.S. App. 253-279). The order of the District Court certifying
the case under the Expediting Act is found at JS App 284–285, 20 June 2000. The settlement
information and final (modified) judgment of 7 September 2006, are available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm>.

25

See Orange-Book-Standard (BGH, 5/6/2009 – KZR 39/06) [German Federal Supreme
Court];

marketing efforts.27 As an identifier of products and their sources, a trademark
performs the role of a communicator, a messenger that spreads information
about what is best, the level and consistency of quality, and what is cheapest.
Protection of trademarks ensures that the consumer can make correct
purchasing decisions,28 thus lowering the transaction costs.29 The ‘confusion
rationale’ is also expressed in the doctrine of passing off, where it also serves
to prevent the consumer from incurring increased transaction costs by
seeking to minimize a consumer’s potential for confusion, guaranteeing to the
marketer that his or her message is heard without interference.
Protection of trade secrets is underpinned again by the notion of
incentives and rewards, but may be located in the realm of unfair competition
law.30 As an item of sensitive information, a trade secret may have commercial
value and may attract the interest of competitors. Here lies one of the major
differences from the fixed costs associated with obtaining a patent, in that the
value of the trade secret and the costs that have to be incurred in order to
protect it are directly related to the willingness of another to try to steal it. The
parties do not bargain themselves, nor are they able to, since one of the
parties intends to keep the asset secret. A regime that protects trade secrets,
therefore, veers towards a ‘liability-rule-based system’ in which the transfer of
an entitlement is protected and its value determined by the state. In the patent
system, independent invention, reverse engineering and public disclosure do
26

European Commission Press release “Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against
Samsung” Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-89_en.htm?locale=en (last
visited 19 February 2014).

27

W Cornish and J Phillips, ‘The Economic Function of Trademarks: An Analysis With Special
Reference to Developing Countries’ (1982) 13 Int’l R of Industrial Property and Copyright
Law, 41; N Economides, ‘The Economics of Trademarks’ (1988) 78 Trade Mark Reporter,
523; W Landes and R Posner, ‘Trademark Law: an Economic Perspective’ (1987) 30 J of Law
and Economics, 265.

28

According to S Diamond, ‘The Public Interest and the Trademark System’ (1980) 62 J of
the Patent Office Soc, 529, the consumer is the ‘unnamed third party in every action for
trademark infringement, since the interest of the consumer lies in the ability of the trademark
to facilitate choice on the basis that a trademark guarantees uniformity of quality at a
consistent level’.

29

G Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”, Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’
(1970) Q J of Economics, 488, demonstrated that this also applies to the quality function of
the trademark. In his work he succinctly describes the market breakdown that occurs when
the consumer can no longer trust the quality message a mark convers.

30

Besen and Raskind, note 17 above, 23–4.

not detract from the proprietary right in the patent, 31 but in the case of trade
secrets they do. Someone who sets out to uncover and apply another’s trade
secret may bring about social gain by increasing competition, but equally he
may reduce the incentive to invent by inducing asymmetric market failure.32
Trade secrecy protection serves to reduce the social costs that comprise
expenditures for protection of trade secrets on one hand, and the cost of ‘not
investing resources designed to effect a transfer of wealth’ on the other. 33 In
balancing those costs associated with the upkeep of a protective regime and
the costs associated with the absence of a market structure that facilitates
bargaining and sale of information, trade secrecy protection is limited to
tortious interference with an entitlement that is not absolute in nature. An
inventor relying on a trade secret cannot prevent the application of
independent research and, if the resulting invention is patentable, he cannot
even prevent a second market entrant from patenting the invention and
forcing the original inventor out of the market. In the first instance, all market
entrants face the same market barriers. This places reverse engineering, for
example, in a peculiar position as it is not a method of independent research
and may be considered theft. Friedman, Landes and Posner advance two
reasons against liability for reverse engineering, namely the administrative
cost associated with proof that independent research did not take place and
the public disclosure argument.34 The line between piracy and acceptable
reverse engineering often lies in the presence of substantial investment and
innovation. This means that reverse engineering does not create a
monopolistic barrier to entry and the investment and innovation associated
with it do not induce asymmetry in the market, since all market entrants face
similar market barriers.
Seen from these economic perspectives of intellectual property, the
grant of private rights serves to create a market for intangibles that would
otherwise be common goods, and the enforcement of IPRs serves to
safeguard not only the investment in innovation, but the prevention of market
failure, by erecting the same barriers to market entry for all competitors.
31

Provided that the entitlement is enforced by the state.

32

D Friedman, W Landes and R Posner, ‘Some Economics of Trade Secret Law’ (1991) J of
Economic Perspectives, 69–70.

33

W Landes and R Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Harvard University Press,
1987) Chapter 6.

34

Note 26 above, 70.

Private rights here are properly understood as entitlements which, although
granted by the state (in the case of patents and copyright in utilitarian
approach countries) or recognized by the state (in the case of copyright in
natural rights approach countries); are nevertheless exercised by private
individuals for their own personal benefit. That the aim of such a grant or
recognition has the public welfare aim to ensure the production or distribution
of goods that would not otherwise exist (sometime characterized as public
goods), does not detract from the private nature of the exercise of those
rights. This is not the same as saying that thus a private “property’ right is
established, except in the most tangential sense. This explains why concerns
relating to over-protection are far more prevalent in the arena of intellectual
property, and the extent to which private actors may make private claims
relating to their exclusive rights, are limited by the instrumental and welfare
goals that initiated the grant of the rights in the first place. 35
Nevertheless, exclusive rights (sometime property-like in nature) in
intangibles facilitate trade in them, usually with the transfer of the underlying
technology as a result. Without an effective IP system, innovators may shy
away from investment and technology transfer, especially when piracy rates
are high and the enforcement of rights is weak. Therefore, it would seem that
it would be wise for a developing country to invest in protection and
enforcement of intellectual property. However, although the TRIPS Agreement
provides the international framework for IP protection and enforcement, it is
not clear that it has served to actually provide the kind of economic
development envisioned by classical economic justifications for protecting
intellectual property. The question arises because of the need to differentiate
between the existence of protection versus calibrating the appropriate level of
protection. The question that has come to the fore is whether the TRIPS
Agreement is calibrated at too high a level of protection for most developing
countries.
Generally, there is little evidence that many countries moved up the
technology value chain with an initially high set of intellectually property
standards.36 Whether and to what extent the TRIPS Agreement limits the
ability to move up the value chain is both an empirical and a legal question.
35

For a thorough examination of the limits and uses of private remedies and their implications
for the ‘property-like’ and private nature of intellectual property law see: Lemley, Mark A.,
Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously (January 31, 2014). Stanford Law and
Economics Olin Working Paper No. 455. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388850 (Last visited 19 February 2014).

36

See p290, Maskus, Keith E. and Jerome H. Reichman, "The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods" 7 Journal of International
Economic Law 279 (2004).

For the moment, there are no studies that point to either a positive or negative
effect on growth from being TRIPS-compliant, although, as will be discussed
below, there appear to be FDI effects. As Maskus points out, some of the
concerns about the negative effects on access to technology may be
addressed by noting that patenting tends not to occur in low-income and lower
middle income countries37, except in specific sectors such as health and
agriculture, primarily due to their lack of imitative capacity and small market
size. In addition, even where technologies may be patented there may be
several alternatives on the market, ameliorating the pricing power that a
patent holder would have. Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw any conclusions
for whether the effects on welfare (or sustainable development) are positive or
negative38, except perhaps in very specific circumstances in specific sectors.
Theoretically, at least, the economic literature points to significant short
term static costs to the increase of intellectual property protection 39, leading to
an increased outflow of royalties and fees. There are of course dynamic
effects, but in an open economy, it is not clear whether those effects would be
of a scale to off-set the static costs. 40 In specific sectors such as health, there
is some mixed evidence that there may be an increase in the static costs,
without necessarily being accompanied by a lowering of the dynamic costs of
patent protection.41 The example of India suggests that increased patent
protection for pharmaceuticals did not drive increased innovation in medicines
37

See p28, Maskus, Keith E. “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue
Paper No. 7, May 2004. Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf
(last visited 19 February 2014).

38

See p21, Fink, Carsten and Carlos Primo Braga, “How Stronger protection of Intellectual
Property Rights affects Trade” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property
and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank,
2005).

39

See p285, Maskus, Keith E. and Jerome H. Reichman, "The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods" 7 Journal of International
Economic Law 279 (2004).

40

p22, Fink, Carsten and Carlos Primo Braga, “How Stronger protection of Intellectual
Property Rights affects Trade” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property
and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank,
2005).

41

p208, Ganslandt, Mattias et. al. “Developing and Distributing Medicines to Poor Countries:
the DEFEND Proposal” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank,
2005).

relevant to the majority of the Indian population but resulted in an increased
focus on medicines and diseases with markets in industrialized countries. 42
This suggests few dynamic benefits from increased patent protection. On the
other hand, the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation
and Public Health found that, in the period to 2006, prices for anti-retroviral
medicines were lowered dramatically. 43 The Commission attributed this to
increased generic competition, the TRIPS transition period and pressure on
pharmaceutical companies from NGO’s and other actors. However, it should
be noted that increased use of price differentiation and agreements
preventing parallel trade may also have played a significant part in the
lowering of prices. As Fink and Maskus 44 point out, until more data on the
demand and price elasticities for technologies and technological products is
available, modeling the impact of higher intellectual property in developing
countries will be difficult, if not unreliable.
The level of innovation in a country, a key development indicator, is
often measured against the number of patent applications and grants.
According to WIPO:
Patent statistics are increasingly recognized as useful indicators of
inventive activity and of technology flows. Patents are a unique
information resource because they contain very detailed, publicly
available information about inventions which can be matched with other
indicators to provide insight into the evolution of technology . . . [T]he
use of the patent system remains highly concentrated with only five
patent offices accounting for the overwhelming majority of all patent
applications in 2012: United States of America (23.1%), Japan (14.6%),
Republic of Korea (8%), China (27.8) and the European Patent Office
(8%).45
42

p85, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health “Public
health, innovation and intellectual property rights: report of the Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health” Geneva: WHO (2006). Available at:
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf (last
visited 19 February 2014).

43

Id.

44

p12, Fink, Carsten and Keith Maskus “Why we study Intellectual Property Rights and what
we have learned” in Maskus, Keith & Carsten Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and
Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank,
2005).

45

See p6 WIPO World Intellectual Property Indicators (WIPO: Geneva 2013), available at

Still, it is no longer self-evident that more patents equate to more innovation.
In fact a report prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, an influential
and independent, non-partisan foreign policy membership organization and
think tank on foreign policy and America’s role in the world, called for a reform
of the US patent system, noting a marked increase in the number of US
patents, and stating:
[t]his increase in patents, however, does not necessarily correspond to
an increase in innovation. Available evidence does not support the view
that enhanced patent protection necessarily stimulates more
innovation. For example, surveys of technology officers reveal that,
except in pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and some forms of
machinery, inventing firms do not view patents as significant reasons to
invest in technology.46
This was one of the impetuses for the 2011 Leahy Smith America Invents Act47
which provided for post-grant opposition, a first-to-file system and significant
changes to standards on novelty intended to weed out low quality patents.
Thus while TRIPS may be associated with increased patenting in
developing countries, this is not necessarily an indicator of increased
domestic innovation in those countries. Patents have multiple uses, including
as useful barriers to market entry against potential competitors. The growth in
patenting in China, where much of the post-TRIPS growth has occurred48 can
at least be partially explained by this phenomenon. More than the existence of
patents, it may be access to the information and know how related to those
patents that is most crucial to development. The ability to absorb knowledge
and human capital drives the capacity to innovate.
Past economic fiascos may even prove to be beneficial for developing
countries in this respect. For example, when the ‘dot-com bubble’ burst in
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2013
.pdf (Last visited 19 February 2014)
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2001, massive investments, made during the 1990s, in high-speed networks
spanning the globe were written off. Simultaneously, thousands of IT workers
that had been attracted from all over the world to work in the onceoverheating Western economies were laid off. A succinct example of
capitalizing on opportunities of technology transfer can be found in India,
where inexpensive access to the web and returning trained human capital
helped to propel India into the position of outsourcing haven for Western
industry, further spawning Bangalore’s version of Silicon Valley.49 Sharing
information and absorbing knowledge, rather than proprietizing intellectual
effort, appears to have been key to India’s economic development. The irony
is that the dot-com’s business model relies on bringing about network effects
by giving products away to build market share. In such a scheme, profit must
be realized later, essentially through brand awareness and additional higher
end services that are not free of charge. In Silicon Valley, the dot-com
survivors took the whole of the available market while others perished.
Bangalore, on the other hand, was not really a survivor, but an heir to the dotcom legacy. This example shows that the capacity to absorb technology and
human capital, rather than the intellectual property system in and by itself, is
the key to economic development. Therefore, in order for people to absorb
science, technology and research, they need to be educated. Developing
countries without a trained population will not be able to participate optimally
in the global knowledge economy. A set of firms with internal imitative,
adaptive and R&D capacity is crucial to creating domestic momentum for
innovation50 rather than simply increasing patent protection. In fact, increased
patent protection may pose a barrier to those very firms with the capacity to
imitate.
The effects on second mover firms and countries are not just limited to
the patent arena. A report on access to knowledge by Consumers
International’s Asia Pacific Office points to the negative effects, brought about
by heightened standards in copyright protection and enforcement in
developing countries. Implementation of TRIPS Agreement obligations, in
particular, appears to act as a barrier to accessing books, journals and
49
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teaching materials. In fact the price of books has increased upon
implementation to the extent that many materials are no longer accessible.
According to the report:
[t]he Berne Convention (1886) . . . specified limitations and exceptions
to the rights it conferred. These limitations and exceptions were further
expanded in the Appendix (1971) due to representations made by
developing countries. . . . The TRIPS Agreement (1995) altered the
balance . . . and extended copyright protection in terms of scope and
varied the limitations and exceptions to the rights provided to copyright
owners. Developed countries have used their influence at the WIPO
and through bilateral and regional trade agreements to further enhance
copyright protection. The space available to developing countries to
adopt policy options suited to their development needs [has]
consequently in each instrument been reduced.51
This fact is even more perverse in view of the advice contained in the
European Commission DG Internal Market study on copyright for the
knowledge economy, wherein flexibility in limitations and exceptions is
deemed essential for consumers and users of copyright works in dynamic
information markets.52 Now that developed economies have started to
recognize that strengthening intellectual property, without providing for robust
limitations and exceptions to these rights, may be too much of a good thing, it
is of the utmost importance to make sure that developing trading partners are
not encouraged or even forced to adopt a complex array of legal regimes that
might widen the knowledge divide and decrease their ability to participate in a
global knowledge economy which is rapidly absorbing more investment than
physical assets do. However, even where higher intellectual property may not
necessarily be conducive to innovation in developing countries, there may
nevertheless be a strong argument that such standards encourage foreign
direct investment and increase the likelihood of licensing, thus contributing to
development and technology transfer. The next section addresses the
evidence for this proposition.
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The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy (IVIR, 2006),
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast_report_2006
.pdf(last visited 19 February 2014). p III: ‘EC legislature should strive to establish a more
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Intellectual property, FDI and cross-border licensing
There exists a tension between policies aimed at encouraging foreign
firms to export, or establish themselves in your market so that needed goods
and services can be produced and sold, and those aimed at ensuring
sufficient spillovers in terms of skills, know-how, information and technology to
enable domestic producers to move up the value chain themselves and
perhaps even compete in the same market. Maskus identities various
channels for spillovers to occur such as: uncompensated imitation; departure
of employees to competitors; access to patent data. He also points to
spillovers that are best described as efficiency savings arising from the effect
that FDI can have on the behaviour of local suppliers and competitors.53 These
include the demonstration effect of use of new technologies in providing a
competitive advantage, especially those that are relatively easily observable;
the efficiency (cost or otherwise) of new inputs from the FDI actor for
downstream producers; the efficiency and learning for suppliers of inputs to
the FDI actor, provided that the actor uses local suppliers; departure and
exchange of employees across firms.
While these ideas make sense from an economic analysis perspective,
it is important that we do not take these effects as a given for most forms of
FDI. Where FDI operates in an enclave and is primarily in export oriented
businesses, there is a low likelihood of natural spillovers. 54 In addition, to the
extent that foreign firms engage in anti-competitive practices, spillovers are
also unduly limited. Finally it the regulatory structure around the protection of
intellectual property that determines the nature and scale of both formal and
informal spillovers. What kind and what level of IP protection is optimal to
ensure technology transfer through FDI?
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The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties aimed especially at
restricting requirements for local content 55, or technology transfer, 56 for
example, may also have made it much more difficult for learning by local
suppliers to take place. This also includes measures that limit regulation of
strict non-disclosure and non-compete agreements with employees, to
prevent them taking information, especially trade secrets, with them to other
employers.
It may be inappropriate to treat FDI as synonymous with technology
transfer57, where the natural effects of FDI are blocked by specifically
designed regulatory mechanisms. In addition, there may be a natural bias
against such spillovers, given that some economic models find that the most
profitable or successful affiliates are those that are most effective at
preventing spillovers of proprietary and non-proprietary knowledge.58
An important issue to note is that the dynamics of international
technology transfer have shifted significantly since 1995. 59 In particular,
whereas the concerns in the pre-1995 period involved deeply asymmetric
relationships between industrialized and developing countries (both in political
power and technical capacity) and between multinational firms and developing
country firms, the post-WTO landscape is very different. Barton points to a
much larger role in the economy for FDI that is export based and is not simply
focused on access to domestic markets and to a much more dispersed supply
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chain for many products that are internationally traded. 60 This shifts the
incentives for multinational enterprises in terms of how and to whom they
provide their technologies. The technical and scientific knowledge base in
most developing countries has also been transformed, reflecting greater
capacity for absorption and adaptation, while also providing a possible
platform for R&D and production for foreign firms seeking competitive
advantage for exports to other markets. 61 In addition, the distance between
industrialized and developing countries, in terms of commercial information
and capacity to take part in transactions has shrunk, increasing the ability for
even small firms to engage in international trade and transactions. Domestic
firms in developing countries also have increasingly greater integration into
global markets, and are often significantly focused on export markets,
meaning that the intellectual property standards and rules for market access
to industrialized country markets have much more impact on policy decisions
to imitate foreign technologies. Finally, publicly institutions and universities
have become greater players on the commercial side of technological
transactions.
At the very least, this new landscape implies a greater willingness and
incentive for industrialized country multinationals to site facilities and use their
best technologies in developing countries. It also suggests a disincentive for
developing country firms to circumvent or imitate foreign technologies without
authorization because they may be shut out of international markets, and in
particular industrialized country markets. The increase in domestic technical
capacity in developing countries, however, also suggests that technological
catch up may be sped up, given a sufficient technological base and access to
technologies at a reasonable price.
As a subsidiary of FDI, key market based channels for technology
transfer are those that relate to joint ventures. 62 Joint ventures require sharing
of technological products, processes and know how, simply to allow the
venture to succeed. They work best when both partners bring know-how and
capital to the table, although these can also include specialized access to
contracting (in the case of preferential procurement policies) or goodwill etc.
To the extent that the venture is time limited, that there is an exchange of
60
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information, technology and personnel, the ability of the partners to move on
after the joint venture is completed and having learned from each other is
extremely useful. Joint ventures can be some of the most efficient tools for
enabling learning by the domestic partners. To the extent that joint ventures
between competitors are not the natural outcome of market behaviour, some
countries have seen fit to condition foreign investment or market access in
strategic economic sectors on the establishment of joint ventures. China has
historically had such requirements, although there remains some
disagreement as to whether these were successful in terms of enabling
technology transfer.63 The use of such measures however, may be restricted
by the existence of provisions in bilateral investment treaties that specifically
prohibit requiring that investments take place in the form of joint ventures by
requiring national treatment in the establishment of investments.64 This means
that it is not possible to require that foreign investment in a particular sector
take place only through joint ventures, without also applying that same
standard to domestic firms.
The issue of the role that IP plays as a determinant of FDI is made
problematic by discussions where we accept the assumption made by many
studies that FDI is equivalent to technology transfer. As noted above, this may
not be a safe assumption and especially in the context of regulatory structures
explicitly aimed at restricting technology spillovers related to FDI, it may
actually be erroneous. Caution should be exercised in evaluating studies and
data using FDI as a proxy for technology transfer. However, in the context of
examining the role that intellectual property protection plays, there may
nevertheless be useful elements in that broader discussion of the
determinants of international technology transfer. Some lessons can be drawn
from the literature:
-

Increased trade in technological goods can lead to spillovers in
learning as well as enabling reverse engineering. 65 However, this
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requires a significant learning capacity in firms and existing
investment in R&D.66 There is evidence from models and some
empirical work that higher IP protection on average increases trade,
but there is no noticeable impact on trade in high technology
goods.67
-

As discussed above, given the appropriate regulatory environment,
FDI may also generate significant spillovers, both through formal
mechanisms (licensing and actual transfer to vertically integrated
subsidiaries) and informal mechanisms. 68 The evidence from
literature is mixed,69 but leans to at least a positive effect for those
countries with significant learning capacity in firms and ongoing
investment in R&D. This is especially true for vertical spillovers
rather than horizontal for which the evidence is far more mixed. 70
However, increasing IPR protection does not seem to be linked to
significant short term increases in FDI.71
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-

Licensing can be a significant channel for technology transfer,
provided there is sufficient absorptive capacity and capital in the
licensee and surrounding firms. 72 However, the more the licensor is
concerned that proprietary knowledge may leak, the less likely they
are to engage in arms-length transactions and the more likely they
are to license only to wholly owned subsidiaries or to joint venture
structures over which they have significant control. 73 They may
either refuse to license into the market or only license older
technologies. Of course, the level of intellectual property protection
also plays a role in a licensor’s assessment of likely leakage of
proprietary technologies. Theoretically, increased patent protection
should make arm’s length licensing to unaffiliated firms more likely.74

-

Intellectual property provides a way to reduce the uncertainty and
transaction costs associated with sharing of knowledge across
borders and allows both providers and recipients to have secure
predictable information about the nature and costs of the
technology which is the subject of the exchange. 75 Intellectual
property also enables the capture of a larger proportion of the spillovers that would otherwise occur into an economy due to licensing,
FDI, or trade, allowing and encouraging a firm to engage in
transactions into an economy.76 Of course, where the aim of
policies is to maximize such spill-overs, there is a conflict between
the desires of the foreign firm and those of the industrial policy of
the domestic government.
This suggests that need to also
emphasize importance of appropriate regulatory structures to
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manage and encourage spillovers and to prevent anticompetitive
behavior.77
The evidence for whether and in which circumstances higher
intellectual property protection increases the likelihood of technology transfer
remains unclear. At best, what can be said is that, where intellectual property
is initially low and protection and enforcement increased, there is evidence
that increased FDI takes place, especially in middle-income countries. 78
These findings do not seem to be replicated for low income countries,
probably in large part due to the fact that they present largely uninteresting
markets for rightholders, except for perhaps in the realm of pharmaceuticals
and agriculture. However, as Maskus points out, there are also studies that
have found little or no correlation between levels of patent protection and
inward FDI even for upper middle income countries. 79 There does however
appear to be a positive link between levels of IP protection and the complexity
and level of technology involved in FDI or licensing: low levels of IP protection
limit the transfer of high technology. 80 For countries at a low level on the
technology value chain, still moving from imitation to innovation, this may not
necessarily be a bad thing as the learning basis for building innovative
capacity will need to be built on earlier more mature technologies before
adoption of newer, more complex ones.
FDI is usually used as a proxy for technology transfer but the studies
and data do not tell us a significant amount about the quality of that FDI, i.e.
whether it results in best available technologies being transferred, the rate
and scale of spill-overs, and whether the transfers are vertical (into directly
owned subsidiaries) into joint ventures or horizontal (into independent
77
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entities). Maskus also cautions that the evidence suggests that it is the
certainty of contract enforcement and IP enforcement rather than the strength
of IP protection that seems to be determinative of decisions to engage in
technology related market transactions.81
The data on FDI and capital goods generally does not allow one to see
whether such transfers were to vertically integrated subsidiaries or joint
ventures or to genuine third parties, and what the scope and speed of such
transfers were, but the implication is clear. Reforms that, at the very least,
ensure compliance with the TRIPS Agreement provide an incentive to outside
companies to carry out FDI and sell capital and other technological goods, as
well as license, in middle income countries. This may also encourage a shift
from FDI to licensing, although it is not clear whether this increases arm’s
length transactions.82 Data also show however that there is little or no positive
effect for lower income or least developing countries, suggesting, as Maskus
argues, that while intellectual property is a factor, it acts in conjunction with
other market factors such as: purchasing power; market size; and domestic
absorptive capacity.83 If intellectual property protection was a key driver of FDI,
then those countries that increased their intellectual property protection the
most between 1990 and 1995 (largely sub-Saharan Africa) would have seen
the largest relative increase in FDI share, which was not the case. In fact the
region saw a significant drop in the share of FDI 84, losing out especially to
countries like China, India and Brazil. The key is reliable, predictable
enforcement rather than IP standards per se. Nevertheless, the level of
intellectual property protection is a major factor in decisions relating to
location of R&D facilities.85 In specific sectors with low imitation thresholds,
such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, levels of IP also influenced FDI
81
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decisions, although these determined whether the nature of the FDI was to a
direct and wholly owned subsidiary or to an affiliate or joint venture, rather
than deterring FDI as a whole.86
Looking at licensing specifically, the empirical studies on licensing are
few and far between and suffer from lack of access to information on the
content of licensing contracts. The empirical case for a link between patent
strength and licensing is mixed at best. 87 A proxy for licensing that is often
used is volumes and flows of royalties and other licensing fees.
Problematically, it is difficult to determine whether increases in such fees
reflect actual increases in the number of transactions or simply reflect the
growth in market power, and thus pricing power, that higher intellectual
property standards and enforcement provide.88 Nevertheless, the existing
studies suggest a strong positive relationship between the level of intellectual
property protection and levels of royalty flows. 89 This however, appears to
hold true only where the initial levels of IPR protection were already relatively
strong.90 At least one study found that the effect was strongest regarding
licensing to non-affiliates.91 Another, focusing specifically on the 1995 – 2005
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post-TRIPS period found a positive relationship between outward royalty flows
and levels of intellectual property protection.92
There is also some evidence that stronger patent rights do shift activity
from FDI towards licensing, although much of that takes place towards local
affiliates rather than horizontally, and is largely limited to countries with
significant imitative capacity. 93 Data from a 2006 study done for the World
Bank suggests that where countries do indeed strengthen patent rights, there
appears to be a corresponding increase in licensing contracts by US firms to
developing country firms.94 This is in line with evidence suggesting a negative
relationship between the level of imitative capacity and the willingness to
license into a country.95 There are also findings that suggest that, at least with
respect to middle-income countries, strengthening patent protection increases
the likelihood of licensing from industrialized countries. 96 The evidence for
such a role in lower middle income and poorer countries appears to be zero.
However, it is important to reiterate that none of these studies are able to
determine whether royalty increases are a result of the exercise of market
power conferred by higher patent protection or are evidence of an actual
increase in licensing contracts as such. Even where such an increase in
licensing contracts is found to occur, we have no information on the terms of
such contracts which may inhibit spillovers beyond the licensee.
Higher patent protection may lead to an increase in the number of
patents registered in a country, and where these are published and fully
92
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disclosed they form a significant part of the learning environment. There is
some evidence that such increases in patent registrations and publications
lead to greater technology absorption in those countries where it takes place. 97
This suggests that the disclosure function of the patent system is a key policy
lever for enabling technology transfer. However, the studies do not, as
Maskus points out, take account of the higher costs and reduced spillovers for
imitation that result from higher patent protection making it difficult to
generalize an appropriate cost-benefit analysis. 98 These findings also do not
examine the consequences of that licensing, namely how rapidly after such
licensing does the technology licensed diffuse into the local economy, at what
rate do spill-overs occur.
The discussion in this section points to at least an ambiguous judgment
on the virtues of the higher intellectual property standards embodied in the
TRIPS Agreement. While the necessity for intellectual property protection is
clear, the existing information on whether this has led to domestic innovation
FDI and technology transfer in developing countries suggests that TRIPS may
not have been an optimal outcome for developing countries. Nevertheless,
many developing countries participated in bilateral and regional free trade
agreements and in the post-TRIPS era that led to them agreeing to higher
intellectual property standards and to restrictions on regulatory freedom. The
next section discusses the structural framework of international treaty making
on intellectual property that should have militated against such further actions
and yet still resulted in many agreeing to higher IP standards. We then go on
to discuss what this implies for their further participation in intellectual property
negotiating processes.

Part II Multilateralism, Bilateralism and
Economic Development
Intellectual property is a solution to the problem of production of public
goods. The aim is to provide sufficient incentive for private sector actors to
invest in the generation of new knowledge and products, but to ensure that
there is sufficient spill-over of knowledge during the life-time of the protection
provided and beyond.99 At this basic level, intellectual property policy is a
97
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trade-off between present (static) anti-competitive costs and the generation of
future technologies (dynamic cost).
Achieving a balance between static and dynamic efficiency is complex
enough in a purely domestic market. The problem in a global market is that
there may be very large international spill-overs. 100 In a system with low
international trade in products and services, such spill-overs pose little
problem as they will tend to equalize over time. If all countries provide
protection for their own citizens but no protection for non-citizens, all countries
will benefit from spill-overs from other countries, and innovators can simply
block products from other countries at the border. However, in a system with
a more than de minimus amount of international trade (both bilateral and
multilateral), the ability to gain protection in multiple markets becomes
increasingly important. In a system where there are asymmetries in innovative
capacity and thus the number and distribution of rightholders, there is an
incentive for countries that are net importers of knowledge and technologies
to provide little or no protection for rightholders from other countries. 101
Countries that are net exporters have a strong incentive to seek protection in
other countries and, at the very least, to be treated at the same level as
nationals. This principle of national treatment is a fundamental element of
international treaties on intellectual property. 102 It requires national level
policies on spillovers that treat both domestic and foreign rightholders equally,
but does not require that all countries have the same policies on how and
when to take action to increase or reduce the level of spillovers into their
domestic market. Of course, existing asymmetries in innovative capacity
suggest that those countries that are net importers may have policies more
focused on ensuring greater spill-overs as most of the rightholders in their
economies will be foreign rightholders in many cases. This may be the
strategy that was followed by so-called ‘imitator’ economies such as Japan
and South Korea in the pre-WTO era and now China in the post-WTO era.
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Net exporter countries have an incentive to seek not just national
treatment, but intellectual property protection on a par with that provided to
firms in their home markets, especially with respect to policies that increase
spillovers and enable faster learning by potential competitors. This dynamic
between net exporter countries and net importer countries results in actions
taken by some countries that reduce or negatively affect the scope and
exercise of intellectual property rights, as part of a broader industrial policy
framework. These actions can be targeted at specific technologies and
sectors, or can sometimes be economy-wide. They can be targeted at
products, or can be targeted at the knowledge itself.
This back and forth on basic national treatment and harmonization is
the fundamental dynamic underlying most international intellectual property
norm-setting.
Beginning with the Berne Convention 103 and the Paris
Convention104 the pattern was set of treaties which required both national
treatment and established a minimum floor of protection (above which
countries were free to increase but not decrease protection). With the
establishment of the International Bureau (Bureaux Internationaux Réunis
pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle) and later the World Intellectual
Property Organization, a series of revisions to the Berne Convention and the
Paris Convention continued to expand the nature and scope of protection
provided by the treaties as well as establishing new treaties on related subject
matter. These continued a slow movement towards greater harmonization
and higher levels of intellectual property protection. Much of this movement
was halted or significantly slowed down by the entry into international
intellectual property policymaking of newly independent developing countries
who inherited their membership in BIRPI and later WIPO, and came to believe
that the international economic system, including the intellectual property
framework posed a barrier to their economic development, including by
blocking access to technology.105 In negotiations, they sought to increase their
103
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flexibility to ensure greater availability of technology in their domestic markets,
and to reduce the barriers that they believed intellectual property posed for
such access. The Declaration on a New International Economic Order (NIEO)
established the principle of special and differential treatment for leastdeveloped and developing countries,106 and the signatories committed to:
Giving to the developing countries access to the achievements
of modern science and technology, and promoting the transfer of
technology and the creation of indigenous technology for the benefit of
the developing countries in forms and in accordance with procedures
which are suited to their economies;107
The NIEO did not succeed in its broader goals and its principles were not
included in the structure of international IP policymaking. Forum shifting of the
intellectual property issue finally resulted in intellectual property being address
in the framework of the Uruguay Round negotiations for the WTO leading to
the establishment of the TRIPS Agreement.
TRIPS reflected the consensus that had developed since the NIEO,
that the best framework for ensuring innovation and access to technology for
developing countries was voluntary, market based transactions between firms
and increasing domestic absorption and creative capacity. The basic
underlying premise is that interventions must address market failures in IPprotected intangibles and may not simply be based on industrial or public
policy goals.
TRIPS implementation is required of WTO members108 with expected
pay-offs in respect of market access and FDI. For developing countries, a
significant element was market access in agriculture, as well as industrial
goods and services. For the US and Europe, greater scope for intellectual
property protection subject to international dispute settlement was a critical
element of the Uruguay Round.109 A broad agreement such as the one that
came out of the Uruguay Round is an inevitable compromise balancing the
interests of multiple countries and multiple business actors. The negotiations
were complex and involved almost all economic sectors in most countries.
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Some delegations were able to be present in all elements of negotiations,
many others were not.110 The final content of the negotiations was really only
able to be assessed in the period after signature and ratification. It is in that
period that many developing countries began to realize what it was they had
truly signed up to in the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, in patent-related
discussions regarding public health, the case brought by the group of
international pharmaceutical companies against South Africa111, raised
international awareness of the restrictions that TRIPS placed on countries to
address major public health issues.112 In multilateral fora, developing countries
began to react against higher intellectual property standards. They blocked
further harmonization initiatives such as the Substantive Patent Law Treaty113
at WIPO, delayed others such as the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of
Broadcasting Organizations114, and kept issues such as such as intellectual
property enforcement off the WTO agenda. They began to seek changes in
existing international norms at the WTO and at WIPO that they believed would
be more favorable to developing countries. At the WTO, this resulted in the
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health115, and ongoing proposals for
109
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disclosure of origin of genetic resources.116 At WIPO, this included beginning
negotiations for treaties on the protection of Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore,117 and the establishment of the WIPO Development Agenda. The
WIPO Development Agenda is of particular note because it represents both a
shift in the view of the institutional role of WIPO but also a broader
philosophical shift in the view of the role of intellectual property protection in
international economic development discussions.
The Development Agenda was the outcome of several years of
pressure by civil society and developing countries raising serious concerns
regarding the implications of WIPO activities for sustainable development.
Negotiations finally concluded in October 2007. The Development Agenda
consists of 45 recommendations in 6 clusters:
- Cluster A: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
- Cluster B: Norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and public domain
- Cluster C: Technology Transfer, Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) and Access to Knowledge
- Cluster D: Assessment, Evaluation and Impact Studies
- Cluster E: Institutional Matters including Mandate and Governance
- Cluster F: Other Issues
The Agenda reflects the key principle of special and differential
treatment for developing countries: that intellectual property cannot be a one
size fits all proposition and must be accommodated to the development status
and needs of each country. This applies to technical assistance but also normsetting.118 Technical assistance and norm-setting are required to take into
account full use of TRIPS flexibilities and not simply implementation of the
highest IP standards.119 WIPO is also explicitly required to take into account
the broader international sustainable development framework, including the
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Millennium Development Goals. The Development Agenda has been
embraced by both member states and the institution and is transforming the
basis and goals on which WIPO works. The most recent and concrete
example of this is the recent conclusion of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate
Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or
Otherwise Print Disabled120 in June 2013. The treaty was the first of its kind to
be devoted to an agreement on exceptions and limitations to intellectual
property (in this case copyright) and that explicitly referenced human rights121
(in particular the rights of the disabled) and the Development Agenda122 in its
preamble.
The Development Agenda gains even more importance in light of the
Cooperation Agreement with the WTO in 1995 that WIPO in charge of
providing technical assistance for TRIPS implementation to developing
country members of the WTO. In fact according to Article 4 of the WTO–WIPO
Cooperation Agreement:
The International Bureau [WIPO] shall make available to developing
country WTO Members which are not Member States of WIPO the
same legal–technical assistance relating to the TRIPS Agreement as it
makes available to Member States of WIPO which are developing
countries. The WTO Secretariat shall make available to Member States
of WIPO which are developing countries and are not WTO Members
the same technical cooperation relating to the TRIPS Agreement as it
makes available to developing country WTO Members.123
Under the agreement WIPO offers its expertise in the area of intellectual
property law to WTO and non-WTO Member States so as to ensure a
120
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successful implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. The nature and content
of such assistance is crucial to whether developing countries can implement
the TRIPS Agreement in ways that are favorable to their development and
leave sufficient flexibility to address issues such as public health, access to
information and misappropriation of traditional knowledge and folklore.
Philosophically, in multilateral fora developing countries have
succeeded in transforming the IP discourse when they have connected the
pure IP issue, not to trade issues as happened in the TRIPS Agreement but to
other frameworks such as human rights and, biodiversity. This was the case
with public health, and with traditional knowledge. The key goal of the
Development Agenda is to create a framework for norm-setting, technical
assistance and policy research that focuses on the needs of developing
nations in the broader framework of sustainable development.124 The
Development Agenda drew from several developments in international fora
regarding sustainable development, including the re-invigoration of a rightsbased approach to economic development issues. This meant not only
revisiting the ‘right to development’ debate begun during the NIEO debate, but
also developing the framework on economic social and cultural rights. This
saw the development of the framework on Article 15 (1) of the International
Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights which includes “The
Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Application (ICESCR
Article 15(1)(b))
The scope and full legal meaning of Article 15(1)(b) has yet to be
articulated. While conceptually attractive, there is very little literature on the
relation of this article to technology transfer. In addition to analyzing its text, it
must read in the context of Article 15(1) as a whole, which also establish
rights to benefit from one’s own creations, which has sometimes been read as
a ‘right’ to intellectual property.125 More extensively developed has been the
issue of the right to health and its relationship to the TRIPS Agreement. The
development and push for the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
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drew on the rights-based approach to health that had developed in the human
rights bodies in terms of requiring states to deliver health services and goods
to their citizens. The right to access medicines at an affordable price was first
established in the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right’s
General Comment 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health.
This was further elaborated by the Committee in its examination of country
reports especially looking at the new measures in the post-TRIPS bilateral
free trade agreements. In particular, as civil society brought forward concerns
regarding TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral FTAs126 the Committee raised
concerns about the ways that signing such FTAs could negatively affect
delivery on the right to health.127 These were concerns that harked back to
concerns regarding the TRIPS Agreement expressed by Paul Hunt, the
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health in his 2004 report to the
Commission on Human Rights, discussing concerns that TRIPS may
negatively impact access to medicines.128
The human rights discourse also served as a useful framing for
developing countries who argued that their obligations to deliver on the right
to health could not and should not be interfered with by the TRIPS obligations.
While powerful as a rhetorical tool, and led to the adoption of the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health as well as pushes to address
neglected diseases at the WHO, this framing did not result in any significant
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement obligations on patent protection. While
the Doha Declaration was an important milestone, during the negotiations,
developed countries pushed hard to limit its scope, losing out on limiting the
scope of disease coverage, but largely winning in limiting the agreement
largely to Article 31 compulsory licensing issues rather than a broader
The Committee is progressively addressing the article and has produced two general
comments on 15(1)(a) and (15(1)(c).
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agreement expanding the scope of uncompensated exceptions and limitations
under article 30. Nevertheless, the human rights discourse and the
Development Agenda have served to transform the nature and scope of
multilateral policy-making on intellectual property. The system is no longer
solely focused on what has been called the “upward ratchet”, of ever
increasing intellectual property standards. 129 Integrated within a broader
discussion and framework, multilateral IP fora have become contested arenas
where the evidence (empirical and otherwise) for the effectiveness and utility
of differing levels of intellectual property is in play.

The Unfinished business of the TRIPS Agreement: Intellectual property
in Bilateral and regional FTAs
The significant shift in the framing of intellectual property in
international IP – related fora should not blind us to the fact that TRIPS
standards have become the floor for international intellectual property
protection. However, the developments at WIPO and the WTO also point to
another crucial viewpoint on the TRIPS Agreement. Whereas many
developing countries viewed it as going too far, major industries in the US and
Europe, pharmaceutical and entertainment in particular, viewed the TRIPS
Agreement as not going far enough. The broader critique was that the TRIPS
Agreement left too much flexibility in its standards, and that it left out crucial
subject matter. For example, the TRIPS Agreement did not succeed in limiting
the grounds for compulsory licenses, nor did it clearly establish a requirement
for data exclusivity for test data information. For Europe, the key issue of
protection of geographical indications remained incomplete. These
dissatisfactions are reflected in the content of the bilateral and regional free
trade agreements that proliferated in the aftermath of the WTO Agreement.
The perceived gap in TRIPS standards, combined with the multilateral
push back by developing countries led to a significant expansion in bilateral
and regional free trade agreement negotiations, now with added intellectual
property chapters and provisions. The post-TRIPS negotiations were
modeled on the Uruguay Round negotiations themselves, providing for
comprehensive multi-sector, multi-issue negotiations based on the single
undertaking principle – that all issues were negotiated as part of a single
bargain and could not be concluded separately. This ensured that a similar
dynamic in terms of capacity to participate, as well as in terms of bargaining
across issued would prevail. Sometimes many of these agreements
addressed investment as well, although many bilateral investment
129
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agreements were concluded separately as investment has historically been
treated as a separate issue from trade.
The move to bilateral and regional FTAs had very specific goals in
mind. The US took the first steps and signed a significant number very early
on, but Europe followed suit very quickly. Tellingly, the majority of these
involved asymmetric negotiations between the major economy and one or
more trading partners usually those who were in already some form of
preferential and non-reciprocal trade arrangement. Generally, the developed
country used a template for the intellectual property provisions. For the US,
the areas pursued by these FTAs included:
Patent
-

-

Clinical test data exclusivity130
Patent term extension due to regulatory delay
Limiting the use of compulsory licensing to working requirements,
emergencies, government use and addressing anti-competitive
practices131
Patent term extension for delays in pharmaceutical marketing
approval132

Copyright
- Temporary reproductions, even in computer memory were to be
treated as reproductions within the meaning of copyright133
- Criminalization and protection of technological protection measures
to include prohibition of production or trade in circumvention tools134
- Extension of term to life of the author plus 70 years135
Trademarks
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Article 4.19, US-Jordan FTA

131

Article 4.20 US-Jordan FTA
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Article 4.23 US-Jordan FTA
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Article 4.10, US-Jordan FTA; Article 17.4(1) US-Australia FTA
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Article 4.13, US-Jordan FTA

135

Article 17.4(4) US-Australia FTA

- Protection for well-known marks beyond confusion136
- Extension of subject matter to sounds and scents137
Enforcement
- Enabling ex officio action in seeking criminal liability for IP
infringement
- Expanding the definition of commercial use
The US was historically, the largest user of FTAs. As of November
2013, the US had bilateral and regional free trade agreements in force with 20
countries.138 These include developing countries such as: CAFTA-DR (Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic), Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Singapore.139 The
US is also conducting negotiations with significant IP components with several
countries in the pacific region with the aim of creating a Trans-pacific
Partnership (TTP) Agreement.140 Negotiations have also begun on a
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement with the
European Union, also with intellectual property components.141 However,
there has been little or no movement by the US towards negotiating significant
agreements with large developing countries such as South Africa, Brazil, India
or China. The TPP conspicuously excludes China from its ambit, while
including almost a significant number of its regional neighbours.142
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Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States.

The EU has also pursued FTAs in the post-WTO phase but with a
slightly differing pattern. The relationship with other developing countries had
largely been managed through the African, Pacific and Caribbean group
process, within large scale agreements addressing political, human rights,
trade and aid issues. Thus the existing set of agreements that the EU had
with developing countries were based on non-reciprocal asymmetric
obligations. However, that changed in 2006. Ending an informal moratorium143,
the EU began in late 2006 to increase its activity in negotiating bilateral trade
agreements. The European Commission explicitly included a TRIPS-Plus
mandate in its trade goals, stating that, “[t]he EU should seek to strengthen
IPR [Intellectual Property Right] provisions in future bilateral agreements... .”144
The EU applied this principle in new negotaitons for Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) with the 76 member African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
group of countries. These agreements aimed to significantly change the
traditional non-reciprocal trade preference relationship that existed between
the EU and ACP group of countries.145
The EU pursued higher intellectual property standards by asking
countries to accede to the WIPO Copyright Tretay and the WIPO
Peformances and Phonograms Treaty; 146 sui generis protection for nonoriginal databases; specific protection for technological protection
mechanisms; accession to UPOV 1991, and protection of geographical
indications beyond wines and spirits. The largest focus was on enforcment,
seeking standards that were the same as those in Europe.147 While
negotiations began in 2006, the only agreement signed and in force to date is
that with the CARIFORUM group of countries.148 That agreement reflect the
intensive focus of the EU on increasing enforcement standards. All other
143
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member groups of the ACP have refused to sign full agreements with
intellectual property and other rules chapters, relying on interim agreements
that addressed only goods issues.
Unlike the US, the EU has also sought to negotiate agreements with
larger developing countries, pursuing negotiations with India149 (still ongoing
as of November 2013) with intellectual property a major sticking point; and
with Mercosur150, although these negotiations have been largely moribund.
Again, there has been no attempt to pursue such an agreement with China.
The pattern of negotiations and failure of trade negotiations reflects the
pattern of asymmetric power in negotiations on intellectual property between
developed and eveloping countries. To the extent that countries in the ACP, in
Latin America, and in South East Asia have signed such agreements, many
have done so to preserve market access that had previously been made
available on a non-reciprocal basis and was now being subject to the
reciprocity principle set up by the WTO. The US and the EU have found it
much harder to persuade countries that were not dependent on preferential
market access to participate. Thus bilateral and regional free trade
agreements may not have had the outcome that may have been intially hoped
for. However, for those countries that have signed bilateral and regional free
trade agreements, the effect goes beyond simply extending privileges to those
countries with whom they have signed such agreements. The TRIPS
Agreement contains no exceptions to non-discriminatory Most Favored
Nation treatment for regional free trade agreements, thus countries that
sign up to such agreements are obligated to extend their new standards to all
WTO members automatically. These agreements have the effect of
mulitlateralizing bilateral obligations on intellectual property in fora that are
external to those such as the WTO and WIPO, where developing countries
have succeeded in moderating and reframing the intellectual property and
147
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development discourse. Despite this however, it is clear that many developing
countries have resisted this forum shopping on intellectual property.
Outside of the negotiations involving developing countries in
preferential trade arrangements who agreed to new reciprocal arrangements,
developed countries began to run into difficulties in their pursuit of higher and
stronger intellectual property standards. For the EU, this has been evident in
its pursuit of agreements with other ACP regional groups outside of the
Caribbean. These have resisted and continue to resist the addition of noncore ‘rules’ issues such as intellectual property in the negotiations. Thus
negotiations with the West Africa, the Pacific, the Eastern and South African
group, all point to a failure of inclusion of intellectual property.
For the US, outside of its traditional sphere of economic influence in
preferential agreements in South and Central America, there has been little
progress in bilateral agreements with IP provisions. The US has not
concluded an agreement with IP provisions with any sub-Saharan country,
with any South-Asian country and in the Asia-pacific region, with one
exception, namely Singapore.151
Neither the US nor the EU has been successful in persuading the
major emerging economies of Brazil, India and China to agree to higher
intellectual property standards in bilateral negotiations. The EU’s negotiations
with India, which started in 2007, came to a standstill over IPRs, particularly
with regard to the contentious issue of protection for pharmaceutical products
and the exclusivity over clinical trial test data desired by the EU. The
negotiations were officially expected to conclude in 2012, but that timeline
proved too optimistic.152 The key priority of India’s strong domestic
pharmaceutical industry and civil society is access to affordable medicines, as
guaranteed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health. India is also asking the EU to screen the
validity of European patents against prior use in traditional Indian medicine
and knowledge related to Indian genetic resources. For the moment it
appears that no agreement on intellectual property will be reached. The US
has continued to pursue regional bilateral IP standards as can been in the
newly launched, negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
involving Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
151
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Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.
Notably absent from this list is China.
The absence of China from the present rounds of bilateral and regional
free trade agreements, suggests one major impetus for nevertheless pursuing
bilateral and regional free trade agreements: the encirclement of China.
Innovative IPR-driven Asia-Pacific economies (Japan, South Korea,
Singapore), Australia, New Zealand, the US and the EU are all seemingly
engaged in a policy of ‘encirclement’ of China, i.e. ensuring that China’s major
and regional trading partners are committed to providing more effective IP
enforcement, especially with regard to border controls and customs controls
aimed at preventing trade in and importation of pirated and counterfeit goods.
It is in this context that initiatives such as the TPP and ACTA (discussed
further below), are relevant.

The Limits of Bilateralism and the rise of Plurilateralism?
The limits of the bilateral approach have led to some new
developments in international IP approaches. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) represented the first plurilateral IP specific negotiations
without any connection to other negotiations or a single undertaking, outside
WIPO and the WTO. ACTA was in many ways a forum-shifting exercise born
out of the frustration over the lack of progress on the fight against piracy and
counterfeiting at the WTO.153 Countries such as Brazil, India and China had
systematically blocked the topic of intellectual property enforcement from the
agenda of the WTO Council for TRIPS. Equally, at WIPO issues of
enforcement are discussed merely at the level of an advisory committee.154
ACTA can also be seen as a consolidation of provisions related to the
enforcement of intellectual property rights contained in the parties’ bilateral
and regional free trade agreements; in fact all ACTA states were connected
through FTAs in one way or another.155
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The ACTA negotiations were concluded, after 11 rounds, in October
2010 in Tokyo. The final text was published on 3 December 2010.156 On 1
October 2011, Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, South
Korea, Singapore and the United States signed the agreement during a
ceremony in Tokyo. On 27 January 2012, twenty-two EU member states (UK,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden) signed ACTA. During the
negotiations, many critical questions from within ACTA countries had been
raised over to the lack of transparency and the nature and content of the
treaty. This extended to the European Parliamnet which rejected the treaty on
4 July 2012 by 478 votes to 39, with 165 abstentions. Controversy persists in
the US due to the failure to seek Senate ratification. The Obama
administration characterised ACTA as a ‘sole executive agreement’, which
means that implementing legislation or changes to the national regime are not
foreseen.
Third countries were vocal in their rejection of ACTA and its genesis.
Paradoxically, the treaty prompted the tabling of the issue of enforcement on
the agenda of in the TRIPS Council for the first time. The Indian delegation
remarked in October 2009 that: “the ACTA agreement was being negotiated in
secrecy and with the exclusion of a vast majority of countries, including
developing countries and LDCs.”157 In June 2010, China, India and Brazil
commented upon draft versions of ACTA,158 stating that ACTA was inconsistent
with the letter and spirit of the TRIPS Agreement. In October 2010, 159 again in
the TRIPS Council, India complained about the fact that ACTA bypassed the
multilateral process and completely ignored the interests of other WTO
members.160 India also voiced its concern over the nature and scope of ACTA
156
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with regard to transit procedures, injunctions, and the way in which treaty reinterprets the term ‘commercial scale’.
The failure of ACTA is twofold: it failed to convince domestic
constituencies even in major proponent countries of its value and it failed to
convince key third parties of its usefulness. It also suffered from a structural
problem: the failure to include the emerging market countries that are
perceived by European and US stakeholders to be the main sources of
counterfeit products. It is not clear what incentive such emerging markets
would have had to particpate or accede to ACTA. In a single issue negotiation
such as ACTA they would not gain any further access or guarantees in other
sectors and would in any case, benefit from the existing legal provisions in
ACTA members. Unlike for goods, there is no regional or FTA exception
(GATT Article XXIV) in the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, ACTA Parties would
not have been able to discriminate against non-ACTA WTO parties in their
implementation of their IP obligations unless they could clearly describe those
provisions as unequivocally TRIP-plus obligations that are not covered by the
national treatment and MFN clauses in TRIPS Articles 3 and 4. This would
however be very difficult as those articles apply to protection of intellectual
property subject matter covered by the agreement. Non-ACTA parties would
therefore already benefit from the enforcement that ACTA parties would have
been obliged to provide for their citizens.

Conclusion: New venues, old venues - Multilateralism and a return to
WIPO?
The difficulties encountered by industrialized countries in expanding
intellectual property provisions through bilateral and regional agreements
appear to have exhausted to a certain extent the alternative venues for
increasing and harmonizing intellectual property. The growth of inter-linkages
with other regimes such as human rights, biodiversity, and climate change
suggest that a pure focus on increasing rights may no longer be viable. The
resistance of many developing countries, even in bilateral and regional free
trade agreements, means that the international discourse on intellectual
property and development may have permanently shifted, whatever forum
intellectual property is raised in. The failure of ACTA suggests that the
domestic constituency for greater protection of intellectual property in
developed countries may no longer be as monolithic and influential as it once
was. The increasing internal debate in industrialized economies on the
relationship between intellectual property and economic, social and human
rights has also played a part in refashioning how intellectual property is

pursued by these countries. It may be that the future holds a return to
multilateral fora, where intellectual property standards may now be discussed
on a new basis, reflecting the historical principles of special and differential
treatment for developing countries, addressing new subject matter of interest
and demand for developing countries, and above, all, the enshrining of the
principle of flexibility and policy space in new treaties. This requires the
recognition of existing policy space and the creation of new policy space,
focusing on the process of graduated increases in protection related to stage
of development, as occurred with Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan. This
means a stronger focus on the interaction between markets and the creation
of appropriate market conditions under which intellectual property protection
can be seen to contribute positively.
The flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement can be used to allow WTO
members to develop at their own pace. IPRs can serve to create a market for
intellectual and industrial creativity and serve as a conduit for technology
transfer, while also being adjusted and modified to address the fact that more
substantive IPRs do not automatically lead to more investment or innovation
and that more active interventions may be required. Market conditions in
developing countries are often marred by corruption, lack of transparency,
market access and human capital, and the inability to absorb technology and
knowledge. Inclusion of developing countries in the world knowledge
economy, however, does offer opportunities for development. This is
supported by the economic progress in developing economies like India,
China and Brazil. Effective enforcement and the establishment of minimum
IPR standards form the conditions for including developing economies in the
global marketplace. However active policies ensuring sufficient learning and
spillovers are also required. Thus constant calibration and balancing are likely
to be the future of intellectual property policy-making in developing countries
and multilateral fora, rather than the pursuit of purely higher intellectual
property standards.

